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Studies of the inter-recipient allocation of aid may be categorized threefold. First, there
are those which attempt to explain the observed allocation of aid. Second, there are
those which seek to describe or evaluate the allocation of aid against normative criteria.
Third, there are those which seek to prescribe the inter-recipient allocation of aid by
calculating the amounts of aid each country should receive, also based on normative
criteria. This paper looks at the second and third categories of studies. It commences by
looking at the different approaches or descriptive measures used, and then repeats this
exercise for the prescriptive literature. It then compares the prescribed allocations of the
different approaches used in the literature. These allocations are compared to actual
allocations and then evaluated against various normative criteria. This reveals
significant differences, both between prescribed and actual allocations and the
evaluations of the different prescriptive approaches.
Keywords: aid allocation, relative needs, per capita income, performance index, poverty
JEL classification: F35, C43, D63, I32The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world.
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland
Camera-ready typescript prepared by Liisa Roponen at UNU/WIDER
Printed at UNU/WIDER, Helsinki
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of
any of the views expressed.
ISSN 1609-5774
ISBN 92-9190-424-4 (printed publication)
ISBN 92-9190-425-2 (internet publication)1
Sierra Leone and Israel were both classified as developing countries by the OECD’s
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1995. Both were therefore eligible to
receive official development assistance from DAC member countries. Sierra Leone had
for many years been among the world’s very poorest countries, often being assessed as
the world’s poorest country. Israel on the other hand was one of the wealthiest list
members, often being assessed as the most wealthy, with quality of life indicators
comparable to those of many DAC donor countries. In 1995 Israel’s income per capita
was 27 times that of Sierra Leone and the life expectancy of its citizens was 43 years
longer. During the period from 1969 to 1995 Sierra Leone received an annual average of
US$74 million in net disbursements of ODA from all sources. This might on the surface
appear like a lot of money, possibly reflecting Sierra Leone’s relative need. But reality
is far more complex, as Israel received over the same period an annual average of
US$937 million—roughly 13 times the amount allocated to Sierra Leone (OECD 2002
and UNDP 1998).1
There have been many studies which have sought to analyse outcomes such as these; the
allocation of development aid is not only a complex but an intensively researched topic.
The overwhelming majority of studies have sought to identify the determinants of inter-
recipient aid allocation, and hence explain or model the allocation of aid among
developing countries. Why do some poor countries receive so much aid and other so
little? The explanations of most studies turn on the perceived motives of donor
countries. Humanitarian, commercial, political and strategic motives are typically
identified. This is consistent with donor policy statements, especially from the larger
donors, which assert that aid is motivated by a humanitarian concern to promote
development and alleviate need, especially in the most needy countries, but at the same
time by commercial, political and strategic self-interests. The literature on this topic
spans more than forty years of research, with some of the better known and more recent
studies including Levitt (1967, 1968); Henderson (1971); McKinlay (1978); McKinlay
and Little (1977, 1978a, 1978b, 1979); Dudley and Montmarquette (1976) Maizels and
Nissanke (1984); Gulhati and Nallari (1988); Gang and Lehman (1990); McGillivray
and Oczkowski (1992); Gounder (1994); Trumball and Wall (1994); Wall (1995);
Katada (1997) and Alesina and Dollar (2000). An overview and critical review of this
literature can be found in McGillivray and White (1993).
While the literature on aid allocation is dominated by these explanatory studies, there
are also smaller bodies of normative research which seek to describe and prescribe,
respectively, the allocation of aid among recipient countries (White and
McGillivray 1995; Hjertholm and White 2000). Put differently, these studies seek to
evaluate or describe how well aid is allocated among recipient countries, and prescribe
or identify amounts which ought to be allocated among these countries, respectively.
The results of these studies are potentially very useful for they can provide information
on how well or optimally donors have being allocating aid. By highlighting mistakes or
sub-optimalities in past aid allocations, they can assist in identifying where corrections
are needed in future. A number of studies have carried out prescriptive (for example,
McGillivray and White 1994; Llavador and Roemer 2001; Collier and Dollar 2002 and
McGillivray  et al. 2002) and descriptive analyses (for example, McGillivray 1989,
1992; Clarke 1992; Rao 1994, 1997 and White and McGillivray 1995) of aid allocation
at the empirical level.
                                                
1 In per capita terms, Israel receipts were 12 times those of Sierra Leone.2
This paper surveys the descriptive and prescriptive literatures. It commences with a
review of the different descriptive approaches, commencing with an examination of
simple correlation and regression approaches and working up to donor performance
indices. This review updates and extends the descriptive literature survey of White and
McGillivray (1995). It then looks at prescriptive studies, paying special attention to the
models of Collier and Dollar (2002); Llavador and Roemer (2001) and McGillivray and
White (1994). The prescribed, or optimal, allocations of these models are compared
among themselves and with Swedish and total DAC ODA allocations. Sweden is of
special interest, as it usually rates highly in aid allocation evaluations. These allocations
are also evaluated using various descriptive measures.
2 Descriptive studies of aid allocation
All descriptive studies of aid allocation can be interpreted as attempts to measure what
McGillivray (1989) called ‘donor performance’ with respect to inter-recipient aid
allocation. Donor performance is, in this context, an increasing function of the
consistency of inter-recipient aid allocation with the relative needs of recipients. The
greater the preference given to needy countries, the greater is donor performance. Need
can of course be defined a number of ways, but it is generally accepted that poor
countries, with low per capita incomes, are the most needy. Note that recipients can be
actual or potential and may not necessary receive a positive amount of aid from the
donor. Potential recipients are in practice usually those on the DAC list of aid recipients.
It follows that donor performance can be, and in some cases actually is, assessed not
only on the basis of those developing countries it gives aid to but to those to which it
gives no aid.
Early attempts to describe aid allocation either used correlation or regression
coefficients (Little and Clifford 1965; OECD 1969; Bhagwati 1972). The correlation
coefficient as a measure of donor performance is that which is obtained from the
regression equation:
n   .,   .   .   ,   = j             +   Y     +     =   A j j j   i, 1 µ β α (1)
where Ai,j is some measure of aid from donor i to recipient j, Yj is j’s per capita income
and α, β and µj are a constant, slope (regression) coefficient and error term, respectively.
The correlation coefficient is simply the ratio of explained to total variation in Ai,j.
Donor performance is maximized when the coefficient equals minus one, which is
achieved by any allocation among countries which satisfies:
.   Y     -     =   A j j   i, β α (2)
That is, aid allocations must lie along a negatively sloped regression line. The estimated
values of α and β are irrelevant. This is not so in the case of the regression coefficient
test, in which donor performance is higher the lower the value of β .
The DAC, UNDP, World Bank and most donor government agencies typically report
what may be described as ‘headcount’ measures of donor performance. Such measures
are simply the proportion of donor aid going to a particular group of countries. Donor3
performance is an increasing function of the proportion of aid allocated to the target
group. The DAC measures donor performance in terms of the proportion of donor GNP
allocated to the least developed country (LLDC) group, in accordance with its adoption
of the UN target of 0.15 percent of donor GNP to these countries (see, for example,
DAC 2001). Other headcount measures are the proportion of ODA to low human
development (LHD) and low-income groups (LIC), classified according to values of the
UNDP’s human development index (HDI) and World Bank estimates of GNP per
capita, respectively (see, for example, UNDP 2002 and World Bank 2002). While these
measures are not necessarily intended by the UNDP and World Bank as indicators of
donor performance, they are still used reasonably widely for this purpose.
Mosley (1987) sought to gauge the redistributive impact of aid using what was termed
as the ‘Lorenz Adjustment’. This adjustment was reinterpreted as donor performance by
White and McGillivray (1992). As is well known, the Lorenz curve is obtained by
graphing cumulative shares of world income against cumulative shares of world
population, ranked by income. If income shares are equal across all population groups,
there is a perfectly equal distribution of world income and the resulting curve is a
straight line with a gradient of 45 degrees. But world income is not perfectly distributed
and the distance between this curve, the Lorenz curve, and the 45 degree line shows the
extent of income inequality. The Gini coefficient gives a numerical value to the extent
of inequality. It is the ratio of the area bounded by the Lorenz curve and the line of
equality to the total area below this line. It follows that perfect equality yields a Gini
coefficient of zero.
To assess donor performance, aid is treated as an income transfer from rich to poor
countries, with no effect on income other than a simple additive one, increasing
recipient income and reducing donor income by the value of the aid allocations. It
therefore flattens the Lorenz curve, reducing the vertical distance between it and the line
of equality. This is the adjustment, the numerical value of which is the change in the
Gini coefficient resulting from aid. This absolute value of this change will be larger the
greater the proportion of aid allocated to poorer countries, and as such it can be
interpreted as a measure of donor performance.
White and McGillivray (1992, 1995) show that donor performance will according to the
Lorenz adjustment not only be a increasing function of the proportion of aid allocated to
the poorest countries but of the total volume of aid. It is not therefore scale neutral, a
desirable property of an index of donor performance with respect to inter-recipient
allocation. The Suit’s index, first adapted to aid allocation by Clarke (1991, 1992),
satisfies this property. It is very similar to the Gini coefficient, the only difference is that
it is based on a slightly different Lorenz curve. This curve is obtained by graphing
cumulative shares of world aid, and not income, against cumulative shares of world
population, ranked by income. With world population divided into m groups of equal
size and ASi,j being the share of donor i’s total aid to country j, the Suit’s index for
donor i is written as:
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The formula for Si is the same as that for the Gini coefficient, the only difference is that
the aid share terms is replaced by an one for income shares.
A number of indices have been designed specifically for the assessment of donor
allocative performance, rather than having been adapted to this purpose. All of these












where  Ii is the performance index for donor i,  wj is a weight relating to the
developmental status of recipient i and Aj is total donor i aid. McGillivray (1989) was
the first study to propose and apply a performance index. That index, subsequently






















min are the highest and lowest observed per capita GNPs among all
developing countries irrespective of whether they receive aid from i and the aid terms
are measured in per capita terms (that is, per head of j’s population). The effect of this
weighting system is to scale or standardize the per capita incomes of countries i within
the range of zero to one hundred, with a weight of 100 if i is the poorest country in
terms of per capita GNP and zero if i is the richest country. The maximum value of the
index is 100, which is observed if the donor in question allocates all of its aid to the
poorest country. The minimum value is zero, which is observed is all aid is allocated to
the richest country.
White (1992) showed that the use of per capita aid in the McGillivray index meant a
regressive reallocation of aid, involving taking aid away from one country and
allocating it to a richer country with a smaller population, could within certain income
ranges increase the value of the index. McGillivray (1992) responded with a revised
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where the aid variables are defined in absolute terms and
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where POP is population.5
There have been a number of extensions or modifications to the McGillivray index.
Choudhry  et al. (1997) changed the weight, replacing per capita income with the
physical quality of life index (PQLI). The PQLI is a composite index, combining infant
mortality, adult literacy and life expectancy. Rao (1994) proposed more substantial
changes to the McGillivray index. Rao pointed out that the indices written in (5) and (6)
do not recognize any effect of aid on per capita income. The income variable used in
these indices, according to Rao, is realized income, in that it will include aid to i from
all donors. Rao therefore proposed a new weighting system in which the weights vary


























































































where xi,j is j’s per capita income net of or prior to aid from donor but inclusive of all
aid from other donors i, ai,j is j’s per capita aid from i and all other aid variables are
measured in absolute terms. More precisely, it follows that
a     Y   =   x j   i, j j   i, − (9)
Rao notes that (8) is not aid scale neutral. That is, the weight is such that a donor can
improve its performance simply by giving more aid to all countries, without altering its
distribution among recipients. Recognizing this, Rao defines a donor specific maximum
performance maximum attainable value of Ii. The rule for obtaining this value is as
follows: for each donor, allocate aid so that aid inclusive income (Yi) is equalized for the
largest feasible number of poorer recipients of donor i aid (Li), at the bottom end of the
pre-aid income (xi,j) hierarchy. This is the equivalent of raising post-aid incomes of as
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Countries at the upper end of the hierarchy are allocated no aid, except in the unlikely
case in which all recipient incomes are equalized. The most equitable feasible allocation
for any given Ai is therefore specified as follows:
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where l and u are the poorest and richest recipients, respectively, in terms of pre-aid
incomes. 
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Rao’s ‘Equity Index’ is then finally defined as follows:
I  





The maximum value of this index is also 100, which is obviously observed if the
donor’s actual aid index defined by (8) equals the maximum value of that index
according to (12).2
White and McGillivray (1995) show that the correlation coefficient, regression
coefficient, Lorenz Adjustment, Suit’s Index, the headcount measure and the
McGillivray indices do not provide either clear or feasible guidelines for precisely how
donors should allocate aid among recipients. The same applies to Rao’s Equity Index. In
particular, most of these indices are maximized by providing all aid to the poorest
country. As Sundrum (1990) points out with respect to indices of inequality, all such
measures contain an implicit welfare or utility function which is maximized by a
particular allocation of income. The same applies to all the measures discussed above,
with the exception of the correlation coefficient, and it is readily apparent that any
indicator which can be written in linear form is maximized by giving all aid to the with
the highest weight (wj). While such an allocation might well benefit this country,
provided it has the capacity to absorb such an amount of aid, which it almost certainly
will not, such an allocation is clearly not desirable. In particular, it would obviously
mean that many very poor countries would be denied aid. A further weakness, or
limitation, of the Lorenz Adjustment, Suit’s Index and Rao Equity Index is that they
cannot readily be applied to non-income based indicators of recipient need.
McGillivray and White (1994) and McGillivray et al. (2002) address both of the
preceding issues and in so doing link the prescriptive and descriptive literatures. These
studies defined donor performance in terms of the consistency of actual to prescribed
allocations, where a given donor’s rating is a decreasing function of the gap between
these allocations. The index of donor performance, Φi, is therefore given as follows:
                                                
2 Rao (1994) proposed a further extension, in which the equity index was calculated not with the actual
total level of donor i aid (Aj) but with a normatively defined level. In applying the index, Rao (1997)
set this level at 0.7 percent of donor GNP, as per the well-known, but widely ignored, UN target.7
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where Ai,j is a prescribed allocation derived from a non-linear optimization problem,
taking into a range of variables, and Ãi,i is the actual amount of aid allocated to j. It
follows that since the sum of Ãi,j equals Ai, the maximum value of (14) is one, which
would occur if Ãi equals Ai for all i. The minimum value of (14) approaches, but can
never equal, minus one and would be observed if all actual aid goes to one country: that
with the smallest Ai. If actual aid is allocated in such a manner, (14) will be closer to
minus one the closer is this prescribed amount to zero. A value of minus one cannot be
observed since all countries in the sample are prescribed a positive aid amount. The
derivation of the prescribed allocations is discussed below. These in McGillivray and
White (1994) they were obtained on the basis of developmental criteria only, whereas in
McGillivray et al. they were obtained on the basis of these criteria and various donor
self-interests.
3 Descriptive studies of aid allocation
A smaller number of prescriptive studies have appeared in the literature. They tend to be
more sophisticated that their descriptive counterparts, usually involving the derivation
of aid allocations from non-linear optimization problems and based on various
properties which are perceived as being desirable in terms of inter-country allocation.
The literature, as Collier and Dollar (2002) observe, is not unlike that which analyses
the optimal allocation of an anti-poverty budget (Bourguignon and Fields 1990).
Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) derive ‘poverty efficient’ aid allocations. Such an
allocation is one which maximizes poverty reduction, pulling the largest possible
number of people above the chosen poverty line. The corresponding optimization
problem, in Collier and Dollar (2002), is to maximize the objective function






subject to the budget constraint
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where PRi is the poverty reducing impact of donor i’s aid, Gj is income growth, αj is the
elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to income and hj is a measure of poverty
such as the headcount measure. It follows that (15) is an identity for the change in the
absolute number of poor people, for a sample of n countries, if this poverty measure is
used. From (15) and (16) the first order conditions for a maximum are:8
POP   Y     =   POP   h     G j j j j j
a
j   i, λ α (17)
where 
a
j i G , is the marginal impact of aid on growth and λ  is the shadow value of aid.
From (17) it follows that
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So that poverty efficient allocations can be derived for each recipient, Collier and Dollar
estimate the following growth equation:
() ε β β β β β β j j j j j j j j   +   X     +   A     + P A   +   P     +   A     +     =   G 6
2
5 4 3 2 1 (19)
where Pj is an index of policy and Xj is a vector of other relevant variables. As Collier
and Dollar application was to total aid impact we drop the subscript i. The interactive
term  AjPj allows the impact of aid on growth to vary according to the policy
environment, which follows from the well-known, and controversial, study of Burnside
and Dollar (2000). It follows from (19) that the marginal impact of aid is:
() A       +     P   A     +   A     =   G j j j j
a
j β β β 5 4 2 2 (20)
A poverty efficient allocation can then be obtained for each recipient by substituting
(20) into (18). After estimating (19) using panel data and thus obtaining estimates of β2,
β4 and β5 (which was negative, indicating decreasing returns to aid), Collier and Dollar































where  αj was assumed to be constant across all j.3 Poverty efficient allocations are
therefore an increasing function of the level of poverty, the level of the policy index and
the poverty reduction elasticity and a decreasing function of the level of income.
Lensink and White (2000) provide a critique of the Collier-Dollar approach, arguing
that it is not a sound guide for policy. Lensink and White argue that the approach is
questionable on three respects: first, its implicit assumption that aid can only reduce
poverty by increasing growth per se; second, its supposition that aid only stimulates
                                                































where β indicates a degree of preference for small countries in aid allocation.9
growth in countries with sound economic policies, and third; the supposition that there
are diminishing returns to aid. Lensink and White point out that there are many more
efficient ways of reducing poverty than growth per se, such as improved service
provision and increasing the assets of the poor. As such aid-induced growth alone is an
insufficient means of reducing poverty. Lensink and White’s second reservation with
the Collier-Dollar approach is largely based on the findings of Hansen and Tarp (2000),
which suggest that the positive relationship between aid and growth is not dependent on
the economic policies of recipients. Further support for these findings are provided in
later studies by Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard and Hansen (2001). If it is the
case that policies are not important in determining the link between aid and growth, then
in the context of the Collier-Dollar approach most aid, with a constant poverty elasticity,
should simply go to countries with low per capita incomes and high levels of poverty.4
Finally, with respect to the third point, Lensink and White correctly observe that with
constant or non-diminishing returns to aid the Collier and Dollar maximization problem
is not bounded, and the poverty-efficient allocation of aid cannot be determined using
their model.
Lensink and White’s criticisms of the Collier-Dollar approach are largely technical in
orientation. A purely normative reservation is worth highlighting. Countries with bad
policies are clearly penalized in this approach: a country with bad policies can get less
aid than one with good policies even though it might be much poorer, in terms of per
capita income, and have far more people living in poverty.5 Yet it is not so much the
countries which are penalized, but poor people living in them. If we accept that there is
a link between aid effectiveness and policies, perhaps what donors ought to be doing is
providing relatively large amounts of aid to these countries and at the same time find
ways to make aid to these countries work better.6
Llavador and Roemer (2001) prescribe allocations according to equal opportunity and
utilitarian approaches. The former seeks to allocate aid in such as way as to equalize
opportunities for growth, and recognizes the efforts expended by countries in achieving
growth, not just the outcomes of these efforts. The latter seeks to allocate aid in such a
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The equal opportunity approach utility function used by Llavador and Roemer is where
υ
t times the contents in the square brackets is the growth rate of a country, representing
the average of countries in effort quartile q of type t, γ is the fraction of total population
of the target countries located in effort quartile q, xi,j is aid allocated to country j relative
                                                
4 Note that in applying their model Collier and Dollar assume a constant poverty elasticity across
countries.
5 For example, with a country with 30 million people living in poverty, a per capita income of $200 and
a policy index of 10 gets just over half the amount of aid as one with 10 million in poverty, a per
capita income of $400 but with a policy index of 20.
6 Benyon (2002) provides further comments on the Collier and Dollar approach.10
to its GDP from i, 
k
j c is the kth circumstance of country j and b
k is sequence of numbers
required to reach a maximum. Circumstances are defined as that portion of j’s growth
not explained, in the context of a regression equation, by effort and aid. In essence,
therefore, this variable is the effect of country-specific circumstances on j’s rate of
growth picked-up by the country specific error term of this equation. Effort is equated
by Llavador and Roemer with good economic management, which is measured by the
weighted average of the budget surplus relative to GDP, inflation and trade openness.
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where ς
q,t is the fraction of total GDP of target countries which is earned in countries of
effort quartile q of type t. The difference between the two functions is that according to
(33) aid allocation gives preference to countries with the greatest potential to achieve
growth, and as such is therefore distributed to maximize the growth rate of total GDP of
the target countries. According to the equal opportunity approach aid, aid allocations
recognize the both the efforts and individual circumstances they face, and seek to
maximize opportunities for growth.
In calculating prescribed allocations Llavador and Roemer maximize (22) and (23)
subject to constraint which in essence states the that the sum of xi,j multiplied by i’s total
GDP (since aid terms are relative to GDP) must equal Ai. This requires use of a grid bs.
Equation (22) reached a maximum with b ≅  0.3  and (23) at b ≅  3.The prescribed
utilitarian allocations are particularly interesting. Only three countries receive positive
aid: Botswana, South Korea and Thailand. All are relatively rich by developing country
standards, especially South Korea. Ironically, this country is now an OECD member,
largely due to its affluence, and as such is not eligible for official aid.
McGillivray and White (1994) commence their analysis by stating three simple
attributes of what they consider a ‘good’ pattern of aid allocation among developing
countries First, the amount of aid allocated to any given country ought to be primarily
in proportion to its need, with the distribution of aid among countries positively
reflecting their relative needs. Second, that, recipient need notwithstanding, some
account ought be taken for the ability of the country to absorb aid inflows. From the
perspective of alleviating need or, more generally, the promotion of development per se,
McGillivray and White assert that it makes little sense to provide large amounts of aid
to countries if they cannot make use of these funds. Third, that, ceteris paribus, the
amount of aid allocated to each country ought be neutral with respect to population size;
that is, with identical need and absorptive capacities, the total amount of aid allocated to
each country ensures an equality in per capita aid. The concern for population scale
neutrality reflects the subjective criterion that aid is essentially about people, thus the
allocation of aid among countries should take explicit account of the number of people
at the receiving end.11
With these attributes in mind, McGillivray and White (1994) proceed to derive
prescribed aid allocations consistent with their stated, developmental criteria. A


























































j RN is a scaled composite indicator of developing country j’s relative need for
aid, POPj is j’s population size, 
s
j AC  is a scaled composite indicator of that country’s
absorptive capacity, Aj is the amount of aid allocated to j and A is the total amount of aid
available for distribution among n countries. W1 and W2 are weights reflecting the
relative importance of need and absorptive capacity respectively. Finally, α is a
coefficient indicating diminishing marginal returns from the developmental impact of
aid and β indicates diseconomies in population scale. The use of these coefficients can
be justified on a number of grounds: economic theory suggests that there are decreasing
returns to scale with aid-financed activities. Notwithstanding, the use of these
coefficients remains necessary if one wishes to avoid prescribing all aid to a single
country: that with the greatest weighted sum of need and absorptive capacity.
s
j RN  and AC
s

















where RNj (ACj) is the actual value of the composite indicator for country j prior to
scaling, RNmin (ACmin) is the minimum actual value of this variable observed across n
countries and RNmax (ACmax) is the maximum actual value observed across n countries.
Necessary to ensure scale equivalence and that the value of (24) is independent of the
components in RNj and ACj, the scaling procedure sets RNj ( ACj) to one if
RNj=RNmax (ACj=ACmax) ,  o r  t o  z e r o  i f  RNj=RNmin ( ACj=ACmin). Since ∂ U/∂ RNj and
∂ U/∂ ACj > 0, the contribution of 
s
j RN the value of (), for a given value of W1, will be
larger the greater is extent of clustering of RNj toward RNmax, and likewise for AC
s
j .
RNj and ACj are defined as follows:
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j k rn , and 
s
j q ac , are specific indicators of need and absorptive capacity
respectively and wk and wq are weights reflecting the relative importance of variables.
These variables are also scaled within the range of zero to one as follows:
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and likewise for 
s
j q ac , . The preceding comments regarding the contribution of RNj and
ACj to (24) also apply to rnk,j and acq,j provided that ∂ U/∂ rnk,j and ∂ U/∂ ack,j > 0. The
reverse is the case if ∂ U/∂ rnk,j or ∂ U/∂ ack,j < 0.
The total amount of aid available for distribution, Ai, is treated as predetermined, as is
typically the case in practice. Equation (24) was maximized, therefore, subject to the
following budget constraint:
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where i = 1, ..., n and z = 1, ..., n. Substituting equation (29) into the budget constraint
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Aid allocations consistent with this share can then be obtained by multiplying (30) by
Ai.13
From (21), it is obvious that the first and second conditions identified above are
satisfied since ∂ U/∂ RNj and ∂ U/∂ ACj > 0. The third condition (population scale
neutrality) may be formally written as:
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The consistency of equation (21) with population scale neutrality according to
McGillivray and White (1994) is obtained if β = 1 - α.
A number of comments can be made regarding the McGillivray and White (1994)
approach. Two are worth highlighting. The first is based on the recognition that many
countries have high relative needs for aid due to bad domestic economic policies,
corruption, the denial of political and civil rights and so on. Giving preference in aid
allocation to these countries can be interpreted as a ‘reward’ for these activities, and
even as a negative incentive to improve their records. The second comment is that no
account is taken for the event to which need is alleviated or filled. Put differently, aid is
equally effective across countries. This will clearly not be the case.
4 Applications
In this section we apply the Collier and Dollar (2002), McGillivray and White (1994)
and Llavador and Roemer (2001) approaches to prescribe aid commitments. Total and
Swedish aid commitments were prescribed for the sample of 59 countries used in
Collier and Dollar based on 2000 aid budgets. This sample contains countries in Parts I
and II of the DAC list, hence the commitments relate to ODA or OA. South Korea is
also included in this sample, despite no longer being on the DAC list and thus being
involved summing the actual ODA or OA commitments to these countries, and then
redistributing these g ineligible for either ODA or OA (its inclusion was based on it
being prescribed large amounts of aid by Llavador and Roemer (2001)). Essentially,
therefore, this exercise amounts according to the different approaches. Parameter values,
weightings, thresholds and so on are as per the original studies.7 To sets of prescribed
amounts based on the Collier and Dollar approach are provided—one for a poverty
headcount based on proportion of the population living on less than US$1 per day and
the other based on the proportion of the population living on less then US$2 per day.
Results are shown in Tables 1 and 2. A dominant feature of these results is that most
countries would receive less aid than they actually do, and a relatively small number of
countries would receive significantly more aid—there would be many losers and few
winners, in a sense. According to approaches of Collier and Dollar, Honduras, Lesotho,
and Uganda would receive far more aid than was actually the case in 2000. China,
Indonesia, Poland and Russia are among the countries which would receive far less.
                                                
7 As in the Collier and Dollar approach aid to India was held at its actual 1996 share of aid, and
countries with low marginal productivities of aid in terms of income do not receive any aid at all,
hence the zero amounts to many countries. A similar scheme operates in the Llavador and Roemer
approach. As it was not possible to fully recalculate the Llavador and Roemer using the current data,
prescribed allocations are only reported for those countries which appear in their sample. Further
details of how these amounts were calculated can be obtained from the author.14
Ethiopia, India, Nigeria and Pakistan would receive much more aid, and Poland, Russia,
Malaysia, China and Colombia would receive much less, according to the McGillivray
and White approach. Thailand and Korea would be the big winners under both the Equal
Opportunity and Utilitarian approaches of Llavador and Roemer.
Correlation coefficients between each of the allocations, prescribed and actual are
shown in Table 3. These coefficients indicate that the allocations are very different,
statistically, with the exception of the Collier and Dollar allocations. Performance index
values for the allocations are shown in Table 4. Calculations are based on the adjusted
McGillivray index, but with different weights. This index was used given its ability to
assess aid allocation on variables other than per capita income, by using non-income
based weights. Collier and Dollar headcount US$2 allocations perform best when the
weights are based on the poverty measures, not surprisingly. McGillivray and White
allocations perform best when the weights are based on the HDI or GDP per capita.8
5 Conclusion
This paper surveyed two related strands of literature on the allocation of development
aid among recipient countries. The first strand consists of those studies seeking to
describe or evaluate the allocation of aid against normative criteria. The second strand
there are those which seek to prescribe the inter-recipient allocation of aid by deriving
the amounts of aid each country should receive, also based on normative criteria. A
specific objective of the paper was to compare the allocations of different prescriptive
approaches, not only among each other but also with actual aid allocations. This
exercise revealed some interesting results. Without exception, actually implementing
these approaches would see tremendous changes in the way aid is allocated, with some
countries receiving much more aid than they actually do and others receiving far less. It
should be emphasized, however, that literature is still a very young, emerging one. That
to date only three studies have been conducted, it seems, emphasizes this. The useful of
these studies can be gauged by their impact on actual donor behaviour, with them
hopefully resulting in more developmentally-, and less politically-oriented, patterns of
aid allocation. Much further work is required if this outcome is to be observed.
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Prescribed and actual allocations
Prescribed ODA or OA commitments
Collier & Dollar McGillivray & White Llavador & Roemer Actual ODA or OA
























Algeria 259.96 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 89.41 0.88 176.80 1.30 0.00 0.00
Belarus 38.93 7.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.26 0.16
Botswana 31.18 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.22 0.01 16.90 0.12 40.33 0.30
Brazil 254.50 1.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 377.96 3.72
Bulgaria 429.57 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.26 0.16
Chile 69.09 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.19 0.12 558.71 4.10 0.00 0.00
China 2977.49 4.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1881.67 15.54
Colombia 1267.37 9.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 65.03 0.64 763.31 5.60 0.00 0.00
Costa Rica 84.10 1.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.63 0.02 532.27 3.91 0.00 0.00
Côte d'Ivoire 385.50 0.24 1357.95 13.38 0.00 0.00 170.69 1.68 41.05 0.30 0.00 0.00
Czech Republic 211.52 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.01
Ecuador 180.88 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.45 0.28 275.90 2.03 0.00 0.00
Egypt. 1779.37 1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 422.67 4.16 126.05 0.93 0.00 0.00
Estonia 105.22 2.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.01
Ethiopia 561.53 10.80 1974.49 19.45 1702.02 16.77 2991.70 29.47 40.17 0.29 0.00 0.00
Guatemala 239.66 13.34 0.00 0.00 1972.12 19.43 65.03 0.64 119.97 0.88 0.00 0.00
Guinea 199.73 0.07 0.00 0.00 101.65 1.00 203.20 2.00
Guinea-Bissau 87.98 0.40 1324.85 13.05 1480.19 14.58 609.61 6.01
Honduras 511.59 11.80 2812.73 27.71 3777.62 37.22 24.38 0.24 28.37 0.21 0.00 0.00
Hungary 312.44 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.01
India 1587.61 7.40 78.38 0.77 66.08 0.65 11826.50 116.51
Indonesia 1986.33 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3169.99 31.23 5184.12 38.05 0.00 0.00
Jamaica 144.31 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 406.00 0.04 3.09 0.02 0.00 0.00
Jordan 574.23 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.13 0.08
Kazakhstan* 302.80 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.51 0.32
Kenya 784.33 28.05 1053.16 10.38 1240.86 12.22 207.27 2.04 57.88 0.42 0.00 0.00
Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.03 0.02 9086.48 89.52 1056.67 77.52
Kyrgyz Rep. 276.05 0.82 2648.25 26.09 873.87 8.61 16.26 0.16
Lesotho 38.46 0.07 313299.00 30.87 3594.68 35.41 20.32 0.20 Table 1 continues
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Prescribed and actual allocations
Prescribed ODA or OA commitments
Collier & Dollar McGillivray & White Llavador & Roemer Actual ODA or OA
























Lithuania 237.46 19.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 81.00 0.01
Madagascar 383.80 0.22 1129.48 11.13 1201.40 11.84 300.74 2.96 23.16 0.17 0.00 0.00
Malaysia 1189.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.26 0.16 1186.73 8.71 0.00 0.00
Mauritania 240.09 0.21 1623.35 15.99 1482.26 14.60 81.28 0.80
Mexico 369.30 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 93.47 0.92 2634.19 19.33 0.00 0.00
Moldova 111.18 2.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 243.85 2.40
Morocco 693.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.44 0.02 376.86 2.77 0.00 0.00
Nepal 402.05 0.93 894.85 8.82 1004.85 9.90 556.78 5.49
Nicaragua 455.21 27.70 1994.39 19.65 2773.38 27.32 24.38 0.24
Niger 304.37 0.07 1113.14 10.97 1115.21 10.99 406.41 4.00 8.47 0.06 0.00 0.00
Nigeria 311.14 0.78 598.35 5.89 630.01 6.21 2970.85 29.27 301.50 2.21 0.00 0.00
Pakistan 1188.07 1.15 1646.60 16.22 0.00 0.00 3267.53 32.19 419.50 3.08 0.00 0.00
Panama 42.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.03 0.02
Philippines 1079.15 1.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 203.20 2.00 672.58 4.94 0.00 0.00
Poland 1606.05 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.44 0.02
Romania 966.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.32 0.20
Russia 1550.12 22.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 365.77 3.60
Rwanda 385.11 9.83 1516.11 14.94 1376.14 13.56 231.65 2.28
Senegal 560.83 0.18 2228.06 21.95 2585.26 25.47 170.69 1.68 21.90 0.16 0.00 0.00
Slovak Republic 147.25 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.22 0.01
South Africa 430.64 13.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.58 0.36
Sri Lanka 467.98 26.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 36.58 0.36 214.71 1.58 0.00 0.00
Tanzania 1401.90 47.08 1023.33 10.08 441.24 4.35 1036.34 10.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thailand 1106.50 3.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 170.69 1.68 2966.45 21.77 7067.88 51.88
Tunisia 578.24 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.26 0.16 205.45 1.51 0.00 0.00
Turkmenistan 20.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.13 0.08
Uganda 848.19 31.35 3700.78 36.46 3472.35 34.21 621.81 6.13
Venezuela 114.84 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.32 0.20 693.86 5.09 0.00 0.00
Vietnam 1776.42 18.52 1740.70 17.15 2779.84 27.39 2357.17 23.22
Zambia 881.18 7.14 2094.83 20.64 2015.74 19.86 121.92 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 156.08 7.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.51 0.32 19.78 0.15 0.00 0.00
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Differences between prescribed and actual allocations
Prescribed ODA or OA commitments
Collier & Dollar McGillivray & White Llavador  &Roemer Actual ODA or OA

























Algeria 259.96 0.39 -259.96 -0.39 -259.96 -0.39 -170.55 0.49 -83.16 0.91 -259.96 -0.39
Belarus 38.93 7.63 -38.93 -7.63 -38.93 -7.63 -22.67 -7.47
Botswana 31.18 0.25 -31.18 -0.25 -31.18 -0.25 -29.96 -0.24 -14.28 -0.13 9.15 0.05
Brazil 254.50 1.46 -254.50 -1.46 -254.50 -1.46 123.46 2.26
Bulgaria 429.57 0.10 -429.57 -0.10 -429.57 -0.10 -413.31 0.06
Chile 69.09 0.85 -69.09 -0.85 -69.09 -0.85 -56.90 -0.73 489.62 3.25 -69.09 -0.85
China 2977.49 4.78 -2977.49 -4.78 -2977.49 -4.78 -1095.82 13.76
Colombia 1267.37 9.05 -1267.37 -9.05 -1267.37 -9.05 -1202.34 -8.41 -504.06 -3.45 -1267.37 -9.05
Costa Rica 84.10 1.81 -84.10 -1.81 -84.10 -1.81 -82.47 -1.79 448.17 2.10 -84.10 -1.81
Côe d'Ivoire 385.50 0.24 972.45 13.14 -385.50 -0.24 -214.81 1.44 -344.45 0.06 -385.50 -0.24
Czech Republic 211.52 0.04 -211.52 -0.04 -211.52 -0.04 -210.71 -0.03
Ecuador 180.88 0.44 -180.88 -0.44 -180.88 -0.44 -152.43 -0.16 95.02 1.59 -180.88 -0.44
Egypt. 1779.37 1.33 -1779.37 -1.33 -1779.37 -1.33 -1356.70 2.83 -1653.32 -0.40 -1779.37 -1.33
Estonia 105.22 2.75 -105.22 -2.75 -105.22 -2.75 -104.41 -2.74
Ethiopia 561.53 10.80 1412.96 8.65 1140.49 5.97 2429.64 18.67 -521.36 -10.51 -561.53 -10.80
Guatemala 239.66 13.34 -239.66 -13.34 1732.46 6.09 -174.63 -12.70 -119.69 -12.46 -239.66 -13.34
Guinea 199.73 0.07 -199.73 -0.07 -98.08 0.93 3.47 1.93
Guinea-Bissau 87.98 0.40 1236.87 12.65 1392.21 14.18 521.63 5.61
Honduras 511.59 11.80 2301.14 15.91 3266.03 25.42 -487.21 -11.56 -483.22 -11.59 -511.59 -11.80
Hungary 312.44 0.21 -312.44 -0.21 -312.44 -0.21 -311.63 -0.20
India 1587.61 7.40 -1509.23 -6.63 -1521.53 -6.75 10238.89 109.11
Indonesia 1986.33 0.87 -1986.33 -0.87 -1986.33 -0.87 1183.66 30.36 3197.79 37.18 -1986.33 -0.87
Jamaica 144.31 1.22 -144.31 -1.22 -144.31 -1.22 -140.25 -1.18 -141.22 -1.20 -144.31 -1.22
Jordan 574.23 0.13 -574.23 -0.13 -574.23 -0.13 -566.10 -0.05
Kazakhstan* 302.80 0.86 -302.80 -0.86 -302.80 -0.86 -270.29 -0.54
Kenya 784.33 28.05 268.83 -17.67 456.53 -15.83 -577.06 -26.01 -726.45 -27.63 -784.33 -28.05
Korea 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.03 0.02 9086.48 89.52 10561.67 77.52
Kyrgyz Rep. 276.05 0.82 2372.20 25.27 597.82 7.79 -259.79 -0.66




Differences between prescribed and actual allocations
Prescribed ODA or OA commitments
Collier & Dollar McGillivray  & White Llavador & Roemer Actual ODA or OA

























Lithuania 237.46 19.96 -237.46 -19.96 -237.46 -19.96 -236.65 -19.95
Madagascar 383.80 0.22 745.68 10.91 817.60 11.62 -83.06 2.74 -360.64 -0.05 -383.80 -0.22
Malaysia 1189.92 0.00 -1189.92 0.00 -1189.92 0.00 -1173.66 0.16 -3.19 8.71 -1189.92 0.00
Mauritania 240.09 0.21 1383.26 15.78 1242.17 14.39 -158.81 0.59
Mexico 369.30 0.15 -369.30 -0.15 -369.30 -0.15 -275.83 0.77 2264.89 19.18 -369.30 -0.15
Moldova 111.18 2.67 -111.18 -2.67 -111.18 -2.67 132.67 -0.27
Morocco 693.12 0.00 -693.12 0.00 -693.12 0.00 -690.68 0.02 -316.26 2.77 -693.12 0.00
Nepal 402.05 0.93 492.80 7.89 602.80 8.97 154.73 4.56
Nicaragua 455.21 27.70 1539.18 -8.05 2318.17 -0.38 -430.83 -27.46
Niger 304.37 0.07 808.77 10.90 810.84 10.92 102.04 3.93 -295.90 -0.01 -304.37 -0.07
Nigeria 311.14 0.78 287.21 5.11 318.87 5.43 2659.71 28.49 -9.64 1.43 -311.14 -0.78
Pakistan 1188.07 1.15 458.53 15.07 -1188.07 -1.15 2079.46 31.04 -768.57 1.93 -1188.07 -1.15
Panama 42.46 0.00 -42.46 0.00 -42.46 0.00 -40.43 0.02
Philippines 1079.15 1.71 -1079.15 -1.71 -1079.15 -1.71 -875.95 0.29 -406.57 3.23 -1079.15 -1.71
Poland 1606.05 1.08 -1606.05 -1.08 -1606.05 -1.08 -1603.61 -1.06
Romania 966.08 0.00 -966.08 0.00 -966.08 0.00 -945.76 0.20
Russia 1550.12 22.14 -1550.12 -22.14 -1550.12 -22.14 -1184.35 -18.54
Rwanda 385.11 9.83 1131.00 5.11 991.03 3.73 -153.46 -7.55
Senegal 560.83 0.18 1667.23 21.77 2024.43 25.29 -390.14 1.50 -538.93 -0.02 -560.83 -0.18
Slovak Republic 147.25 0.09 -147.25 -0.09 -147.25 -0.09 -146.03 -0.08
South Africa 430.64 13.61 -430.64 -13.61 -430.64 -13.61 -394.06 -13.25
Sri Lanka 467.98 26.39 -467.98 -26.39 -467.98 -26.39 -431.40 -26.03 -253.27 -24.81 -467.98 -26.39
Tanzania 1401.90 47.08 -378.57 -37.00 -960.66 -42.73 -365.56 -36.87 -1401.90 -47.08 -1401.90 -47.08
Thailand 1106.50 3.42 -1106.50 -3.42 -1106.50 -3.42 -935.81 -1.74 1859.95 18.35 5961.38 48.46
Tunisia 578.24 0.38 -578.24 -0.38 -578.24 -0.38 -561.98 -0.22 -372.79 1.13 -578.24 -0.38
Turkmenistan 20.31 0.00 -20.31 0.00 -20.31 0.00 -12.18 0.08
Uganda 848.19 31.35 2852.59 5.11 2624.16 2.86 -226.38 -25.22
Venezuela 114.84 0.65 -114.84 -0.65 -114.84 -0.65 -94.52 -0.45 579.02 4.44 -114.84 -0.65
Vietnam 1776.42 18.52 -35.72 -1.37 1003.42 8.87 580.75 4.70
Zambia 881.18 7.14 1213.65 13.50 1134.56 12.72 -759.26 -5.94 -881.18 -7.14 -881.18 -7.14












Collier & Dollar Headcount US$2 1
Collier & Dollar Headcount US$1 0.87 1
McGillivray & White 0.04 0.002 1
Llavador & Roemer Equal opportunity 0.01 0.03 0.42 1










Collier & Dollar Headcount US$2 3.27 5.22 99.29 99.17
Collier & Dollar Headcount US$1 2.57 4.31 99.69 99.39
McGillivray & White 44.78 46.4 89.98 86.75
Llavador & Roemer Equal opportunity 6.54 4.86 81.25 62.78
Llavador & Roemer Utilitarian 3.59 1.24 65.11 37.95
Total ODA 17.17 15.57 87.75 91.44
Swedish ODA 6.78 8.2 91.2 95.84
2
2